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Criminal Law*
By MARIANNA J. READ"
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 532.080 contains the
statutory authorization for persistent felony offender (PFO)
sentencing.' While the statute has undergone several revisions since
its 1974 enactment,2 it remains as a "special authorization for the
disposition of offenders who have committed several serious
offenses."'
The sentence enhancement authorized by KRS section 532.080
resulted from the legislative determination that repeat offenders
attain a criminal status, and that such offenders should receive a
more severe penalty than that ordinarily authorized for underlying
substantive offenses.4 Under the statute, a PFO is defined as one
who has been convicted of at least one prior felony.' The prior
* The analysis and conclusions contained herein are solely that of the author and
do not represent any position of the United States Department of Justice.
** Assistant United States Attorney. B.A. 1975, University of Kentucky; J.D. 1978,
University of Kentucky.
- Ky. REv. STAT. § 532.080(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS]
provides:
When a defendant is found to be a persistent felony offender, the jury, in lieu
of the sentence of imprisonment assessed under KRS 532.060 for the crime of
which such person presently stands convicted, shall fix a sentence of imprison-
ment as authorized by subsection (6) of this section. When a defendant is charged
with being a persistent felony offender, the determination of whether or not he
is such an offender and the punishment to be imposed pursuant to subsection
(6) of this section shall be determined in a separate proceeding from that pro-
ceeding which resulted in his last conviction. Such proceeding shall be conducted
before the court sitting with the jury that found the defendant guilty of his most
recent offense unless the court for good cause discharges that jury and impanels
a new jury for that purpose.
I KRS § 532.080 was revised in 1976, 1978 and 1982.
3 KRS § 532.080 commentary (1974).
1 See Hardin v. Commonwealth, 573 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Ky. 1978) ("KRS 532.080
does not create or define a criminal offense. It recognizes a status and, in a proceeding separate
and apart from the initial trial, fixes a penalty which is to be imposed rather than the one
fixed by the jury on the initial trial."). See also Sweeney v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.2d
598 (Ky. 1969); Smith v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
5 A previous felony conviction may result in a charge of being a persistent felony
offender (PFO) provided the sentence was for "a term of imprisonment of one (1) year
or more or a sentence of death was imposed," and "the offender was over the age of eigh-
teen (18) years at the time the offense was committed." KRS §§ 532.080(2)(a)-(b); (3)(a)-(b).
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felony must meet certain established criteria to qualify as a
predicate for the statute's purposes.6 The statute clearly anticipates
that in the usual case, PFO charges will be considered immediate-
ly upon the defendant's conviction of the second underlying
felony.7
Unlike the law in some jurisdictions, the Kentucky statute
predicates the degree of the PFO sentence enhancement upon the
nature of the most recent underlying felony conviction' and the
number of prior convictions.9 Thus, KRS section 532.080 contains
two degrees of PFO status, with each degree carrying a different
method for computing the permissible enhancement based upon
the nature of the defendant's most recent felony conviction.' A
6 See The criteria which the previous felony conviction must meet are listed in KRS
§ 532.080(2)(c), (3)(c). For the text of these criteria, see text accompanying note 14 infra.
I KRS § 532.080(1) (requires that the persistent felony proceeding "shall be conducted
before the court sitting with the jury that found the defendant guilty of his most recent
offense unless the court for good cause discharges that jury and impanels a new jury for
that purpose").
- See KRS § 532.080(5)-(6).
' See KRS § 532.080(2)-(3), (5)-(6). The legislature considered an option that would
require automatic life imprisonment upon a defendant's designation as a PFO. This option
was rejected in Kentucky "because of a judgment that under some circumstances life im-
prisonment for a habitual criminal is not justified. An example would be an offender who
has committed three class D felonies, none involving injury to the person." KRS § 532.080
commentary (1974).
The United States Supreme Court recently held that an automatic life sentence provi-
sion in the South Dakota PFO statute, S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979)(amended
1981); was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3009
(U.S. June 28, 1983). In Solem, the Court stated: "[W]e hold as a matter of principle that
a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been
convicted." Id. at 3009.
The Court in Solem set forth three criteria to consider in the Eighth Amendment
analysis: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 3010. The Court noted that
in this case the defendant's six previous felony convictions were all for nonviolent crimes
involving no injury to the person. Id. at 3013. The Court concluded that due to the PFO
statute the defendant was subject to a greater penalty than others in the state who had com-
mitted more serious crimes. The only other state imposing a life sentence on the recidivist
is Nevada, and the maximum penalty has never been imposed in Nevada in a comparable
case. Id. at 3014.
10 KRS § 532.080(2) defines a PFO in the second degree as an individual who, being
more than 21 years of age, "stands convicted of a felony after having been convicted of
one (1) previous felony." Under KRS § 532.080(5), a defendant convicted of being a PFO
in the second degree must be sentenced to "an indeterminate term of imprisonment pur-
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conviction of either first or second degree PFO, however, carries
the additional impact of rendering the defendant ineligible for pro-
bation, shock probation or conditional discharge."
During this past year, the Kentucky appellate courts have
rendered several significant opinions construing various elements
of KRS section 532.080. This Survey will focus upon the Kentucky
statutory scheme dealing with PFOs and the recent decisions in-
terpreting that scheme.
I. UNDERLYING FELONY CONVICTIONS
A PFO is, by statutory definition, a person who stands con-
victed of a felony after having been convicted of at least one
previous felony.' 2 The prior felony convictions provide the basis
for a PFO charge and, upon conviction, an enhanced sentence.
These underlying convictions, however, must meet the statutory
criteria to support a PFO conviction. The prior felonies must have
been committed when the offender was at least eighteen years of
age, and a sentence of a term of imprisonment for one year or more
or a sentence of death must have been imposed.' 3 In addition, the
offender must fall into one of the following categories as to each
underlying felony:
1. Completed service of the sentence imposed on any of the
previous felony convictions within five (5) years prior to the date
of the commission of the felony for which he now stands con-
victed; or
suant to the sentencing provisions of KRS § 532.060(2) for the next highest degree than
the offense for which convicted."
A PFO in the first degree is defined as one who, being more than 21 years of age,
"stands convicted of a felony after having been convicted of two (2) or more felonies."
KRS § 532.080(3). The defendant convicted as a PFO in the first degree is to be sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of not less than 20 years, nor more than life, if his most recent
underlying felony conviction is a Class A or B felony. KRS § 532.080(6)(a). If this defend-
ant's most recent felony conviction is a Class C or D felony, however, the indeterminate
sentence is to be not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years. KRS § 532.080(6)(b). For
a description of each felony class aid the potential sentences for each see KRS §§ 532.020
(1980), .060 (1974).
- KRS § 532.080(5), (7). Additionally, a defendant convicted of being a PFO in the
first degree is not eligible for parole "until having served a minimum term of incarcera-
tion of not less than ten (10) years." KRS § 532.080(7).
2 See KRS § 532.080(2), (3).
" KRS § 532.080(2)(a)-(b), (3)(a)-(b).
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2. Was on probation, parole, conditional discharge, con-
ditional release, furlough, appeal bond, or any other form of
legal release from any of the previous felony convictions at the
time of the commission of the felony for which he now stands
convicted; or
3. Was discharged from probation, parole, conditional
discharge, conditional release, or any other form of legal release
on any of the previous felony convictions within five (5) years
prior to the date of commission of the felony for which he now
stands convicted; or
4. Was in custody from the previous felony conviction at
the time of commission of the felony for which he now stands
convicted; or
5. Had escaped from custody while serving any of the
previous felony convictions at the time of commission of the
felony for which he now stands convicted.' 4
So long as one of the above criteria is met, a felony conviction from
any state will suffice as a valid basis for a PFO conviction. 5
A. Sufficiency of a Felony Conviction from Another State
In James v. Commonwealth, 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court
was presented with an issue which required construction of KRS
section 532.080(2)(a).' 7 The defendant in James had been convicted
as a first degree persistent felony offender. The PFO conviction
was based, in part, upon proof that in 1972 James had entered a
guilty- plea in Nebraska to a felony charge of forgery for which
he received probation for two years.' 8 On appeal to the Kentucky
Supreme Court, James contended that the Nebraska conviction was
" KRS § 532.080(3). The text of KRS § 532.080(2), relating to PFO in the second
degree, is the same as the quoted material.
KRS § 532.080(2)-(3).
36 647 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1983).
See id. at 796. KRS § 532.080(2)(a) requires that a prior felony conviction result
in a prison sentence of one or more years or a sentence of death in order to give rise to
a PFO charge.
," 647 S.W.2d at 796. In addition to the forgery conviction, James had pleaded guilty
to a murder in Virginia and had been sentenced to 28 years in prison in 1972. Id. While
James was on parole for the murder conviction, he was tried and convicted for second degree
burglary, first degree rape and receiving stolen property. Id. at 794. At the PFO stage of
his trial for these offenses, James was convicted as a first degree PFO, for which he was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 794-95.
[Vol. 72
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insufficient to support a PFO conviction under KRS section
532.080(2)(a) because his sentence had been probated by the
Nebraska court.' 9
The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected that argument and held
that the Nebraska conviction was sufficient to support the PFO
conviction.2' The Court found that KRS section 532.080(2)(a) does
not require actual imprisonment. " Rather, all that is necessary is
that the prior felony have carried a possible penalty of one year
or more.
22
In deciding that James' Nebraska conviction did carry such a
possible penalty, the Court focused on the law of Kentucky rather
than the law of Nebraska. Since the Court found that the Nebraska
conviction was for an offense classified as a felony by Kentucky
law, the conviction was upheld as a valid predicate offense for the
PFO charge.23
B. The Use of a Conviction for Possession of a Firearm
In two recent cases, the Kentucky appellate courts addressed
the issue of whether a conviction for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon may be utilized as a predicate felony for a PFO
conviction. 4 Since conviction for possession of a handgun by a
19 Id. at 796.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the 1974 Commen-
tary to KRS § 532.080 as "an expression of legislative intent." The Court quoted the follow-
ing language from the commentary:
Subsection (2) sets forth a definition of a previous felony conviction. It requires
in Subdivision (a) that the previous offense must have been accompanied by a
sentence of imprisonment for one year. This requirement seeks to account for
the possibility of conviction from a state which has a distinction between felony
and misdemeanor that is different from that used in this state. Thus, although
such conviction is for an offense designated in that other state as a misdemeanor,
it can be treated as a felony for purposes of this statute if it carried a penalty
of one year or more.
Id. (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting KRS § 532.080 commentary (1974)).
22 The Court summarily concluded: "Mhe offense in Nebraska was a forgery, which
is a felony in this state." Id.
24 See Eary v. Commonwealth, 659 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1983), aff'g 29 Ky. L. Sua.
12, at I (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as KLS]; Commonwealth v. Jackson,
650 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1983), aff'g 29 KLS 10, at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1982).
1983-841
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convicted felon is clearly a felony under Kentucky law,25 the issue
in the cases was whether use of the possession conviction for a PFO
charge abrogated the holdings of Boulder v. Commonwealth26 and
Heady v. Commonwealth.27
In Boulder and Heady, the Kentucky Supreme Court had pro-
hibited the use of a possession charge by a convicted felon as a
predicate crime for PFO convictions.2" The defendants in both cases
had been convicted of a substantive crime and the possession
offense at the same proceeding. The two felony convictions were
then utilized in each case to support a PFO conviction.29
In Commonwealth v. Jackson,'3 the court of appeals con-
sidered whether a possession charge by a convicted felon could ever
be used to support a PFO conviction. The court first noted that
the statute dealing with possession of a handgun by a convicted
felon 31 is itself a sentence enhancement statute because the under-
lying conduct, possession of a handgun, would be lawful but for
the defendant's status as a convicted felon. 32 The court recognized
that there are sound reasons "for the proposition that a person's
status as a convicted felon may not be used against him twice in
the same proceedings for sentence enhancement. ' 33 However, the
court held that Boulder and Heady provided "no authority to pre-
vent the use of one's status on two separate occasions and in two
separate proceedings." ' 34 Thus, the court of appeals held that if an
individual has been convicted previously on a possession of a hand-
gun by a convicted felon charge and then commits a subsequent
2 See KRS § 527.040 (1974) (possession of a handgun by a convicted felon is a Class
D felony).
26 610 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1980).
27 597 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1980).
28 610 S.W.2d at 617; 597 S.W.2d at 614.
29 610 S.W.2d at 617; 597 S.W.2d at 613.
30 29 KLS 10, at 5, aff'd, 650 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1983). See notes 39-40 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Kentucky Supreme Court's treatment of the issue.
In Jackson, the defendant had pleaded guilty to armed robbery in 1975 and entered the
same plea in a 1980 indictment for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The issue
under consideration was whether the conviction for possession of a handgun by a convicted
felon could be used to enhance punishment under the persistent felony offender law.
31 KRS § 527.040 (1975).





felony, the possession charge may be used as a predicate felony
for PFO purposes.35
A similar issue was presented to the court of appeals in Eary
v. Commonwealth,36 and a different panel of judges reached the
same conclusion.37 In Eary, however, the court emphasized that
Boulder and Heady applied only to cases where one offense was
used to obtain multiple punishments in one proceeding. 38
This issue was conclusively settled when Commonwealth v.
Jackson was heard by the Kentucky Supreme Court on discre-
tionary review.39 In Jackson, the Court certified the law in
Kentucky:
It is our holding that where an accused has been previously
convicted of the crime of possession of a handgun by a convicted
felon, that conviction assumes the status of any other offense at
a subsequent trial and that both the felony conviction which was
the basis of the handgun offense and the handgun offense may
be utilized under KRS 532.080 in the persistent felony phase of
the trial.40
Thus, after Jackson, the Heady and Boulder decisions are limited
so as to preclude sentence enhancement under KRS section 532.080
only when the possession charge is used twice at the same trial to
35 Id.
316 29 KLS 12, at 5. In Eary, the defendant had been convicted of four felony offenses
between 1971 and 1975. In 1981 he was arrested in a bar after he displayed a handgun and
was subsequently indicted for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and for being
a persistent felony offender. Eary argued that "it was error to use his status as a felon
to establish the substantive offense of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon because
this triggered enhanced punishment via the persistent felony offender statute and violated
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, denying him due process of law." Id.
" Id. at 2. The court stated: "[T]o rule otherwise would grant a convicted felon a
limited license to carry a firearm." Id.
11 Id. at 1-2. While the court conceded the defendant's contention that Boulder and
Heady provided the applicable precedent, it distinguished Eary from these cases: "The com-
mon prohibitive theme running through both cases discusses the use (as a primary charge)
and reuse (as a conviction in the persistent felony offender portion of the trial) of a defen-
dant's status (convicted felon) to increase his punishment, or using it a 'second time' against
him." Id. at 1. The court concluded that Eary was different from Boulder and Heady
because the conviction for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon was used only
once against the defendant (for PFO purposes) in Eary. Id. at 1-2.
650 S.W.2d at 250.
0 d. at 251-52. The Court also affirmed Eary, acknowledging Jackson and indicating
an unwillingness "to further extend that holding." 659 S.W.2d at 200.
1983-84]
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enhance punishment." If a third felony is committed, however, the
possession conviction is sufficient as a PFO basis felony. 2
C. The Use of a Felony Conviction Obtained while on Parole
as a Predicate Felony
In Williams v. Commonwealth, 3 the defendant contended that
he had been denied effective assistance of counsel in the proceeding
which resulted in his first degree PFO conviction." Williams'
argument was based upon the construction of KRS section
5 32 .0 80 (4 )S that pertains to the sufficiency of a prior felony con-
viction to support a PFO conviction."'
Williams had been convicted on four counts of forgery in
August 1973, imprisoned on those charges, and paroled on August
29, 1974. On February 4, 1975, Williams was returned to prison
as a parole violator and subsequently was paroled again. On June
2, 1976, Williams was convicted of theft by unlawful taking for
crimes committed while paroled, on February 21, 1976.1' Williams
argued that the felony conviction of theft by unlawful taking could
not be used as a basis for the PFO conviction because he had com-
mitted that crime while on parole.48
" The Court stated that to use a possession conviction to add to the punishment for
a single crime (e.g., assault), and then to use that same conviction for a PFO charge would
be impermissible "double enhancement." 650 S.W.2d at 251.
4 In concluding its discussion of Boulder and Heady, the Court stated:
The holding of Boulder, when the surplusage is distilled, is merely that when a
single prior felony is utilized to create an offense or enhance a punishment at
the trial of the second crime so created or enhanced, it may not be used at that
trial to prosecute the defendant under KRS 532.080. We are unwilling to fur-
ther extend that holding.
Id. (emphasis in original).
41 639 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
44 Id at 789.
41 KRS § 532.080(4) provides:
For the purpose of determining whether a person has two (2) or more
previous felony convictions, two (2) or more convictions of crime for which that
person served concurrent or uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprisonment
shall be deemed to be only one (1) conviction, unless one (1) of the convictions
was for an offense committed while that person was imprisoned.
46 639 S.W.2d at 790.
41 Id. at 789.
" Id. at 790. The court summarized Williams' argument:
Appellant's argument is that KRS 532.080(4) provides that where a person
serves concurrent terms of imprisonment, they shall be treated as one convic-
CRMNAL LAW
While the opinion in Williams is predicated upon the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the decision is noteworthy because
of the construction the court gives to KRS section 532.080(4). In
rejecting Williams' claim that the conviction for theft by unlawful
taking while on parole was not a legally sufficient "prior felony,"
the court first noted that the PFO statute is "designed to strengthen
the Commonwealth's attempts at rehabilitation of convicted per-
sons" by providing greater penalties for those persons. 49 The "con-
current sentence break" set forth in KRS section 532.080(4) 50 was
interpreted by the court as not applying to those persons who have
demonstrated a lack of capacity for rehabilitation. 1 According-
ly, the court held that KRS section 532.080(4) applies only to those
individuals who have been convicted of two felonies prior to serv-
ing any time in prison. 2 No error, therefore, was found in
Williams' PFO conviction because "the rehabilitative efforts on
his first conviction failed, the rehabilitative efforts on his second
conviction failed, and he is, under the statute, a persistent felony
offender in the first degree upon receiving his third conviction.""
II. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO KRS 532.080
Both the statute and its 1974 commentary make it clear that
the procedure under KRS section 532.080 is different from that of
a criminal trial on substantive charges. The statute, in fact, does
not refer to the procedure as a "trial" but rather as a
"proceeding." ' The obvious reason for the difference is that KRS
tion for purposes of being a persistent felony offender. Appellant reads the statute
to require this even when, as here, prison time has been served after the first




50 For the text of KRS § 532.080(4), see note 45 supra.
639 S.W.2d at 790. To reach this conclusion, the court relied on the commentary
to KRS § 532.080, which states that KRS § 532.080(4) is "another effort to avoid the level
of persistent felony offender for persons who might be rehabilitated through an ordinary
term of imprisonment for the offense most recently committed." KRS § 532.080 commentary
(1974).
,1 639 S.W.2d at 790.
53 Id.




section 532.080 does not create a substantive criminal offense, but
only provides for sentence enhancement upon proof of a certain
status of the defendant."s
The PFO statute describes the procedural rights of a defendant
charged with being a persistent felony offender. KRS section
532.080(1) clearly provides for trial by jury in a "proceeding" that
is separate from the defendant's last trial on a substantive felony
charge. While the purpose of this separate proceeding is stated as
being to avoid juror taint by evidence of the substantive felony,'5 6
the statute clearly anticipates that the same jury will try both the
most recent substantive felony and the PFO charge.5 7 The verdicts
on both the substantive crime and the PFO proceeding must be
unanimous."
The jury verdict requirement is the only procedural aspect of
the PFO proceeding that is expressly addressed by KRS section
532.080. Other issues as to due process in the proceeding have,
however, been presented to the Kentucky appellate courts.59 A
review of those cases decided this survey year discloses that since
KRS section 532.080 is a method of sentence enhancement, the
defendant so charged is not entitled to the full panoply of due pro-
cess rights at the PFO proceeding.
" See note 4 supra.
56 According to the commentary, the requirement that the PFO determination be made
in a separate proceeding is "an essential part of the provision if unfair influence upon the
question of guilt or innocence of the most recent offense is to be avoided." KRS § 532.080
commentary (1974).
11 See note 7 supra and accompanying text for the text of KRS § 532.080(l) requir-
ing the PFO proceeding to be conducted with the same jury that tried the most recent
substantive felony charge.
11 The commentary discloses the manner in which the PFO proceeding should be
handled. First, the defendant is tried for his present offense and, if convicted by the jury,
sentenced under the provisions of KRS § 532.060. Immediately after this trial, the PFO
proceeding would be held before the same jury to determine whether the requirements of
KRS § 532.080 have been met. If so, then the defendant is to be resentenced by the jury
according to the provisions of KRS § 532.080. However, if the jury does not unanimously
agree as to whether the defendant is a PFO or as to his proper sentencing, then the sentence
orginally placed upon him under KRS § 532.060 stands. KRS § 532.080 commentary (1974).
" See Payne v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1983); Pace v. Commonwealth,
636 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1982); Finney v. Commonwealth, 638 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 826 (1983).
[Vol. 72
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A. Due Process Issues
In Finney v. Commonwealth,6" the court of appeals was
presented with two issues relating to the due process rights of a
defendant at a PFO proceeding. 6' Finney first contended that the
trial court erred in failing to give a jury instruction concerning his
right to remain silent during the PFO proceeding. 62 Since Finney
did not testify at the PFO proceeding, he argued that under Carter
v. Kentucky63 the trial court erred in failing to give the requested
instruction on the privilege against self incrimination. 6"
The court of appeals in Finney agreed with the trial court that
the instruction was not required during a PFO proceeding, because
of the nature of a PFO proceeding.65 The court first reasoned that
Carter did not necessarily apply to the PFO situation because the
PFO proceeding is "an enhancement proceeding, a circumstance
occasioned not by a substantive offense but rather by status as a
persistent felony offender." ' 66 The court also noted that the very
nature of a PFO proceeding left little room for any possibility of
prejudice by the failure to give the requested instruction. As the
court pointed out, all of the requisite elements of proof are set out
in KRS section 532.080, and once those elements were established
"the PFO-II conviction became a virtual fait accompli." 67 In light
of this ruling, it would appear that very few cases will ever pres-
ent reversible error solely on the grounds of self incrimination at
a PFO proceeding.
Finney's second procedural argument in relation to the PFO
proceeding was based upon Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 8.28(l).68 Pursuant to that rule, Finney asserted that the trial
60 638 S.W.2d at 709.
" See id. at 710.
62 Id.
63 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981)(trial court must give jury instruction on the privilege
against self incrimination upon the defendant's request). This ruling has been incorporated
into Ky. R. CpR . P. 9.54(3) [hereinafter cited as RCr].




61 RCr 8.28(1) states in part:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial
1983-84]
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court erred in continuing the PFO hearing during his absence from
the courtroom. 9 The court implicitly recognized that RCr 8.28(1)
does apply to a PFO proceeding, 70 but held that the rule was not
violated in this case because of the "overwhelming inference" from
the record that Finney's absence from the proceeding was purely
voluntary.7
Pace v. Commonwealth7 1 was decided by the Kentucky
Supreme Court shortly after Finney was rendered by the court of
appeals. In Pace, the defendant appealed from his conviction on
the substantive offenses of murder and first degree assault as well
as his second degree PFO conviction." While the case was reversed
and remanded on issues involving the substantive offenses,74 the
opinion also provides guidance on the nature of a PFO proceeding.
The defendant claimed that error was committed in the PFO
phase of his trial because the prosecutor introduced inflammatory
and irrelevant evidence. 7 As in Finney, the Court asserted that the
proof at a PFO proceeding is relatively straightforward as "the
Commonwealth merely needs to establish a simple check list of
technical statutory requirements. "76 Due to this characteristic of
the proceeding, the Court cautioned that, on a retrial, the prosecu-
tion should refrain from introducing prejudicial or inflammatory
evidence such as the underlying facts of the defendant's prior
convictions.77
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of the sentence. The defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has
been commenced in his presence shall not prevent proceeding with the trial up
to and including the verdict.
69 638 S.W.2d at 710.
11 See id. at 710-11. The court quoted RCr 8.28(l) and set forth the facts indicating
that the defendant's absence from the courtroom was voluntary. Id. The obvious implica-
tion is that, under RCr 8.28(1), the defendant's due process rights would have been violated
if he had been involuntarily absent from the courtroom.
11 Id. The court stated that a contrary holding would "allow defendants to orchestrate
the progress of their trials at their own convenience." Id. at 711.
72 636 S.W.2d at 887.
11 Id. at 889.
14 Id. at 889-90.
11 Id. at 890. The Court noted that the first witness in the PFO proceeding testified
to the "gruesome fact pertaining to the prior felonies" and noted that Kentucky courts
have repeatedly held that such evidence is inadmissible under Berning v. Commonwealth,
565 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1978). 636 S.W.2d at 890.




Since the jury in the majority of PFO cases would have already
heard proof as to the defendant's most recent felony conviction,
it is difficult to see how a defendant could be prejudiced by the
same proof being resubmitted in the PFO proceeding. Given the
"checklist" nature of the proceeding, however, it is clear that such
evidence should be excluded because proof as to the facts of the
underlying felony would serve no possible purpose except to in-
flame the jury at the expense of the defendant and judicial
economy. 78
B. Jury Instructions in a PFO Proceeding
Payne v. Commonwealth 79 addressed the question of whether
a second degree PFO instruction should be given to the jury in
every case where first degree PFO is charged. In Payne, the defen-
dant contended that Coleman v. Commonwealth0 and Satterly v.
Commonwealth"' required such an instruction in every case it was
requested.82
The Payne Court acknowledged that prior Kentucky law sup-
ported Payne's position on including the lesser PFO offense
instruction. 3 In tracing those earlier cases, the Court found that
this instruction requirement "seems to have evolved out of Brown
v. Commonwealth."" In reviewing Brown, however, the Court
found that the case erroneously cited prior decisions in creating
the PFO instruction requirement and that this error had resulted
in a line of cases, including Satterly and Coleman, which misap-
plied the law. 5
The Payne Court overruled the cases since Brown which had
held that a PFO second degree instruction was mandatory when
requested by a defendant charged, with first degree PFO to the
extent that the cases made the instruction automatic. 6 In place of
" The Court in Pace noted: "Such evidence can only serve to lengthen what is in-
tended to be quick and simple procedure and to inflame the jury." Id.
79 656 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1983).
10 125 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1939).
437 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1968).
52 656 S.W.2d at 720.
83 Id.
1" Id. (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Ky. 1964)).
Id. at 720-21.
" Id. at 721. The Court overruled the following cases: Boyd v. Commonwealth, 521
S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1974); Satterly v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d at 929; Rogers v. Common-
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this automatic rule, the Court held that the lesser degree instruc-
tion is to be given only where the evidence would support a f'mding
of second degree PFO.87 Thus, no instruction is required in cases
like Payne where the sufficiency of the underlying felony is not
challenged. As the Court stated:
First-degree felony offender is one charge. The fact that two con-
victions must be proven does not justify breaking down the
charge into two parts so as to give the jury the opportunity to
pass on each prior conviction in the absence of some evidence
bringing one or both prior convictions into dispute."
While Payne did change the prior law on lesser offense instruc-
tions in PFO cases, it should be noted that the Payne ruling is based
on the accepted law for lesser offense instructions in other types
of criminal cases. 89 Thus, Payne simply abolished a judicially
created rule that treated PFO proceedings on this issue different-
ly from the norm. After Payne, PFO cases will be treated like other
types of cases with the lesser offense instruction given only if there
is some evidence to support such a theory. While the jury is not
required to believe any of the evidence, Payne precludes an
arbitrary verdict without support of evidence.
CONCLUSION
From the cases, the commentary and the text of the statute
itself, it is clear that KRS section 532.080 is a sentence enhance-
ment procedure for status offenders. 9" The commentary indicates
that the purpose of sentence enhancement is to recognize legislative-
ly those cases where a shift of sentencing objectives from rehabilita-
tion to protection of the public is appropriate. 91 The statute,
wealth, 399 S.W.2d 299 ( Ky. 1966); Marcum v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 886 (Ky.
1966); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.2d at 728.
8 656 S.W.2d at 721.
Id. (emphasis in original).
,9 Id. at 721. See also Cox v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1973) (where
there is no evidence suggesting that a defendant is guilty of any offense other than murder,
no lesser offense instruction should be given) (cited in Payne v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d
at 721).
"o See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
"' See KRS § 582.080 commentary (1974). As the court of appeals stated in Common-
wealth v. Jackson: "We have no doubt that the legislature intended this provision to pro-
tect the public from those individuals who have demonstrated their indifference to public
welfare by repeated convictions of felony offenses." 29 KLS 10, at 5.
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therefore, should be construed in a manner that most effectively
promotes the legislative goal, yet protects individual defendants
from improper classification. A review of the Kentucky appellate
cases during this survey period reflects just such a balancing.

